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This  paper  estimates  the  impact  of  monetary  policy  on  exchange  rates  and  stock 
markets for eight small open economies: Australia, Canada, the Republic of Korea, New 
Zealand, the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. On average across 
these countries, a one percentage point surprise rise in official interest rates leads to a 
1% appreciation of the exchange rate and a 1% fall in stock market indices. The effect 
on exchange rates is notably weaker in the non-Organization for Economic Cooperation 
and  Development (OECD)  countries  with  a managed float.  For the OECD  countries, 
there is no robust evidence of a change in the effect of policy during the global financial 
crisis. For the non-OECD countries, there is some evidence of a stronger effect of policy 
on stock markets during the crisis, although further research is needed to investigate 
whether this is a result of measurement issues. 
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1.  Introduction 
 
Policymakers, market commentators and academics have differing opinions on the effect 
of  monetary  policy  on  the  economy  during  the  global  financial  crisis.  For  example, 
Krugman (2008) argues that ―we are already… [in] a state of affairs like that of the 1930s 
in which the usual tools of monetary policy…have lost all traction‖. In contrast, Mishkin 
(2009) argues that monetary policy is, if anything, more effective during the crisis. He 
argues that commercial interest rates during the crisis are high because risk spreads 
have risen over and above the policy rate, and hence if the US Federal Reserve’s policy 
rate had not been cut, commercial rates would have been even higher. Moreover, as 
lower  interest  rates  reduce  the  risk  of  a  serious  depression,  the  Federal  Reserve’s 
monetary policy also reduces the macroeconomic risk component of the risk premium, 
further lowering interest rates. In other words, monetary policy reduces the risk of the 
negative feedback loop between macroeconomic conditions and risk spreads known as 
financial accelerator (Bernanke, Gertler and Gilchrist 1999). 
 
Both Mishkin and Krugman are referring to the full transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy
1 to real variables: a two-part process consisting of, first, the transmission from the 
central bank’s policy rate to financial markets, and then, second, from financial markets 
to real activity (the final goal). Most empirical studies use a vector autoregression (VAR) 
methodology to examine the full transmission mechanism from policy to real variables.
2 
However, with many estimated parameters, quarterly data, and long lags, the financial 
crisis is simply too short to be examined using a standard VAR. 
 
The alternative and less ambitious approach pursued here is to examine the first stage 
of the transmission mechanism, from the policy rate to a range of financial variables.  
Financial variables are much more appropriate for shorter samples because (i) they are 
available at high frequencies, and (ii) they respond almost instantaneously to publicly 
available information, such as,  interest rate announcements.   In contrast, most real 
variables only respond with long and variable lags to monetary policy.  
 
This paper follows an e vent study approach to examine  the effect of monetary policy 
announcements (the ―events‖) on exchange rates and the stock market indices for eight 
small open economies: Australia, Canada, New Zealand (NZ), the United Kingdom (UK), 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. While empirically tractable, an 
event study skirts many of the key issues in the debate on the effectiveness of monetary 
policy  during  the  crisis,  such  (i)  the  degree  to  which  policy  rates  are  passed  on  to 
borrowers,  (ii)  credit  constraints,  (iii)  the  impact  of the  lower  bound
3 and (iv) soaring 
liquidity and risk premia in interbank markets. However, to the extent that these factors 
affect the (perceived) future profitability of firms, they will be captured in the stock 
market’s  response  to  a  policy  change.    Hui  et  al.  (2009)  find  rising  liquidity  and 
counterparty risk premia in interbank markets lead to a failure of covered interest parity 
                                                 
1  That is, the effect of a change in overnight (or similar) interest rates by a central bank. 
2  For example, see Berkelmans (2005) for Australia and Tang (2006) for Malaysia 
3  When nominal interest rates approach zero.  2          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
during the crisis—suggesting a change in the relationship between interest rates and 
exchange rates. As such, this paper examines some of the key issues indirectly. 
The key to the event study approach is to use a short window around a monetary policy 
decision to isolate causality. In general, the policy interest rate responds to the same 
economic  data  and  financial  conditions  as  other  financial  variables,  leading  to  a 
simultaneity problem. As such, a standard regression—outside the short window around 
monetary  policy  changes—of  the  financial  variable  on  the  policy  rate  is  difficult  to 
interpret as both the policy rate and financial variable could be responding to the same 
excluded economic variables or causality could be running from the financial variable to 
the policy variable. However, if policy makers do not respond to new information on the 
day of the policy announcement, then the change in the policy rate on the day of the 
announcement, is relatively exogenous to movements in financial variables on the same 
day.
4 As such, a regression of the change in the financial variable on change in  the 
policy rate isolates causality from the policy rate to the financial variable. 
 
The other cornerstone of this approach is to examine unanticipated changes in monetary 
policy (often known as monetary surprises) rather than actual changes in the policy rate. 
Rational expectations suggest anticipated changes in the policy rate have no impact on 
financial variables as verified empirically by Kuttner (2001) for the United States (US).
5 
This paper uses changes in 1-month market interest rates in each country on the day of 
the announcement as the measure of the monetary policy surprise. Interbank loans , 
bank bills and bankers’ acceptances are traded in many more countries than futures or 
other derivatives commonly used to identify monetary policy surprises. In doing so, this 
paper is able to examine the effect of policy in countries that have been overlooked by 
the literature. 
 
To preview some of the results, the crisis may have strengthened the effect of policy 
surprises  on  stock  markets  in  non-Organization  for  Economic  Cooperation  and 
Development  (OECD)  countries,  although  there  is  little  robust  evidence  that  it  has 
changed  the  effect  of  policy  on  exchange  rates,  and  the  effect  of  policy  in  OECD 
countries.  To  our  knowledge,  this  is  the  first  paper  that  uses  the  event  study 
methodology to provide estimates of the effect of domestic monetary policy for Asian 
countries  such  as  the  Republic  of  Korea,  Indonesia,  Malaysia  and  Thailand,  and 
provides  updated  estimates  of  the  effect  of  monetary  policy  of  financial  markets  in 
Australia,  NZ,  Canada and  the  UK.  On  the  whole,  including  the  crisis period,  a  one 
percentage point surprise rise in interest rates appreciates the exchange rate by around 
1–3% in most countries with a freely floating exchange rate (more for Australia, less in 
the  Republic  of  Korea),  and  a  0.5%  appreciation for  countries  with  a managed float 
(Thailand, Malaysia and Indonesia). The same surprise lowers stock markets by around 
1–1.5% in most developed and developing countries. 
 
                                                 
4  If economic data are released on the same day as the monetary policy decision then one needs to be 
careful that financial variable is not responding to the economic release partially known by policymakers. 
See Section 3.  
5  Actual policy changes comprise both the anticipated and unanticipated (surprise) changes, but financial 
markets should only respond to the latter on the day of announcement.   
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The rest of the paper is as follows. Section 2 reviews the literature, while Section 3 
discusses methodological issues such as the selection of countries, the crisis period and 
the removal of influential observations. Section 4 discusses data issues and presents 
descriptive statistics. Section 5 presents the main results, while Section 6 discusses a 
number of extensions. Section 7 concludes. 
 
 
2.  Literature Review 
 
2.1   Monetary Policy Shocks and the Expectations Hypothesis 
 
Theory suggests that agents are forward looking and have rational expectations. This 
means an anticipated change in the policy interest rate will only have small effects on 
financial  variables  as  the  change  is  already  ―priced  in‖.  For  the  US,  Kuttner  (2001) 
estimates the effect of changes in the fed funds rate on the treasury bills, notes and 
bonds using the event study approach. His main contribution is to separate anticipated 
changes from unanticipated changes using the change in the 1-month fed fund futures 
yield on the day of the announcement.
6 He finds that although in general interest rates 
(3-month and longer) only respond weakly (with a coefficient of 26.8 bps for the 3-month 
rate) to changes  in short  rates, they  respond  strongly  (coefficient  of  79.1  bps) to 
unanticipated  changes  and  negligibly  to  antici pated  changes,  in  line  with  theory. 
Kuttner’s  finding  underlines  the  importance  of  measuring  the  response  of  financial 
variables to monetary policy shocks, something of focus in this paper. 
 
One of the criticisms of this approach has been that empirical tests of the expectations 
hypothesis generally fail, even with the use of fed fund futures (Piazzesi and Swanson 
2004). That is, fed fund futures are not unbiased predictors of the fed fund rate, and 
some proportion of the forecast errors are predictable ex ante. That said, risk premia 
tend to change only at business cycle frequencies. So Kuttner’s approach of identifying 
monetary policy shocks using the change in the futures rate on the day is still relevant 
since it differences out the term premium. Because interbank loans, bank bills, bankers’ 
acceptances  and  similar  instruments  involve  an  exchange  of  principal  and  are  not 
exchange-traded unlike futures, they are likely to have even larger term premia than 
futures contacts, making Kuttner’s differencing approach particularly important. 
 
A number of other papers in the literature have used the change in market interest rates 
to  identify  monetary  policy  shocks.  For  example,  Zettelmeyer  (2004)  uses  the  1-day 
change around a monetary policy announcement in the 3-month market interest rate in 
Canada,  Australia  and  NZ  to  identify  the  effect  of  a  monetary  policy  shock  on  the 
exchange rate. Kearns and Manners (2005) use the daily change in 1-month and 3-
month bank bills, bankers’ acceptances, wholesale bills and the London Interbank Offer 
Rates (LIBOR) to identify the size of the monetary policy shock for Australia, Canada, 
                                                 
6  The  fed  fund  futures  contract  pays  out  based  on  the  difference  between  the  futures  rate  and  the 
average of the fed fund rate over the life of the contract. Based on the expectations hypothesis, in 
equilibrium, these must be equal.  4          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
NZ, and the UK, respectively. However, unlike Zettelmeyer whose dependent variable is 




2.2  Mechanisms Involving the Exchange Rate 
 
The  uncovered  interest  parity  (UIP)  condition  states  that  a  change  in  the  difference 
between  domestic  and  foreign  interest  rates  implies  changes  in  the  expected 
appreciation or depreciation of the exchange rate. UIP suggests that if foreign interest 
rate is held constant over the coming year (and the expected exchange rate one year 
ahead is also constant), a one percentage point increase in the domestic interest rate (a 
one  percent  monetary  surprise)  will  appreciate  the  exchange  rate  expectation 
instantaneously by the same amount. In practice, however, movements in risk premia 
seem to be more important in affecting the exchange rate (Fama 1984). Fama also finds, 
on average, high yielding currency tends to appreciate rather than depreciate. Clarida et 
al. (2009) and Brunnermeier et al. (2008) have also documented the correlation between 
market’s assessment of risk and return to currency speculation. If market’s perception of 
risk  is  more  (or  less)  sensitive  to  monetary  policy  during  crisis,  then  a  different 
relationship between monetary policy and exchange rates can be expected. 
 
There are many ways a crisis can change the effect of policy on the exchange rate. One 
is through liquidity. Brunnermeier and Pedersen (2009) present a model where initial 
losses can lead to ―liquidity spiral‖ of funding problems for traders, forced sales, prices 
that  deviate  from fundamentals  and further  margin  calls.  In  a  similar  environment, a 
negative monetary policy shock (a fall in interest rates) can have standard first round 
effects  of a  depreciation  of  the  home  currency.  But  if  tight funding  conditions  cause 
margin  calls  for  speculators  taking  long  positions  in  the  home  currency—and  other 
participants are unable to raise funds to move against the change—then there can be a 
second round depreciation and hence a larger effect of monetary policy during crisis.  
 
A closely related mechanism is that high-bid ask spreads during crisis may make it more 
difficult for market participants to take advantage of deviations from fundamental prices. 
Bid-ask  spreads  in  foreign  exchange  markets  widened  markedly  during  the  global 
financial crisis. For example, the spread of the Australian dollar widened to 3.5 times its 
pre-crisis  level  as  ―risk  retrenchment  and  the  unwinding  of  leveraged  position  … 
generated  one-sided  markets‖  Debelle  (2009).  Burnside  et  al.  (2006)  report  that 
deviations from UIP can become unprofitable to take advantage of relative to the risk 
taken due to buy-sell spreads in the foreign exchange markets, and the effect of order 
flow on spreads.
7   
 
Hui et al. (2009) report that the close relationship between the futures price of foreign 
exchange and interest rate differences across countries —covered interest parity—was 
                                                 
7  Debelle (2009) notes that during the crisis, the ―Australian dollar was reportedly used as a proxy for 
trades in the Korean won during New York trading hours when the won was not traded, and as a proxy 
for the Brazilian real during Asian time when the real was not traded‖.  
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disrupted during the crisis. While it is difficult to know whether this makes  monetary 
policy more or less effective, it suggests that mechanisms linking exchange rates and 
interest rates work differently during the crisis.  
 
 
2.3  Empirical  Evidence  on the  Effect of  Monetary  Policy  on  Exchange 
Rates 
 
The exchange rate is a key component in the monetary transmission mechanism for an 
open economy, for example, to real variables such as net exports. As discussed earlier, 
UIP  suggests  a  positive  interest  rate  surprise  should  lead  to  an  appreciation  of  the 
exchange rate. For the developed small open economies considered in this paper, a 
positive  interest  rate  surprise  generates  a  statistically  significant  appreciation  in  the 
exchange rate. Kearns and Manners (2005) find that a 100 basis points (bps) surprise, 
which is much larger than the average surprise, leads to a 1–2% appreciation of the 
exchange rate,  depending  on  the country  being  considered.  Zettelmeyer  (2004)  gets 
broadly similar results.  
 
Kearns and Manners also decompose monetary policy surprises into timing surprises 
(where expectations of future rates do not change, but the policy change occurs earlier 
than previously expected) and levels surprises (where the policy change also increases 
expected policy rates several months out). They do this by adding an extra variable for 
the  change  in  the  second futures  contract that  starts  two  to  three  months  away.  As 
expected, a levels surprise leads to a much larger exchange rate impact than a timing 
surprise.  Assuming  no  further  expected  change  in  rates,  Kearns  and  Manners  find, 
across  all  countries,  the  appreciation  is  around  twice  as  large  as  predicted  by  UIP, 
although the changes for Australia are in line with UIP. 
 
2.4  Stock Market and Monetary Shocks 
 
Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) use the event study approach to investigate the interaction 
between monetary surprises and stock market index. They apply the same estimation 
procedure as the papers above and find that a 25 bps surprise cut in the fed funds rate 
raises the stock market by 1%. Like those studies, they report a larger effect for levels 
surprises than timing surprises. They also find that the results are particularly sensitive 
to a number of outliers, which they identify and remove statistically, a methodology also 
adopted here.  
 
In theory, the value of a share is equal to the present discounted value of its cash flows. 
In the model of Campbell (1991), adapted by Bernanke and Kuttner (2005), a surprise 
increase in the policy rate can decrease stock prices in three ways by: (i) decreasing 
expected future dividends, (ii) increasing the future risk-free rate or (iii) increasing the 
equity premium (above the risk free rate) required to hold equities. For Bernanke and 
Kuttner’s  (2005)  study,  most  of  the  adjustment  is  through  the  premium  in  expected 
returns investors require to hold equities (the equity premium). 
 
As with exchange rates, the impact of monetary policy on stock prices during crisis can 
be different in a number of direct and indirect ways. An interest rate rise leading to first 6          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
round falls in stock prices can lead to a second round of selling induced by margin calls. 
In times of crisis, balances in the margin accounts will fall, while credit is tighter, so any 
second round effects due to ―liquidity spirals‖ are likely to be stronger. If monetary policy 
has a stronger effect due to the financial accelerator mechanism as argued by Mishkin 
(2009), then a rate cut during crisis leads to a larger-than-normal rise in expected future 
dividends, and hence a larger-than-normal rise in stock prices. Conversely, if interest 
rates cuts are not passed on to firms, then the effect of policy on future profitability is 
weaker, and so policy changes during crisis have a smaller effect on stock prices. Policy 
announcements during crisis that involve keeping rates lower for longer, such as in the 
US during the global financial crisis, may reduce the expected risk free rate by more 
than is normally expected. Policy may also have a stronger effect on risk premia during 
crisis as argued by Mishkin (2009). This may be particularly important as Bernanke and 
Kuttner’s (2005) result suggest that most of the impact of monetary policy changes for 
the US is through expected equity premia.  
 
There  are  not  many  papers  investigating  the  effect  of  domestic  monetary  policy 
surprises on Asian stock markets using the event study approach. Instead, studies have 
looked at the effect of foreign (US and European) monetary policy shocks. Wongswan 
(2009)  finds  a  significant  effect  of  US  monetary  surprises  on  the  stock  markets  for 
Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, and Malaysia, but not for Thailand. Kim and Nguyen 
(2009) find US and EU monetary policy shocks have a significant negative impact on the 




3.  Methodology 
   
This paper analyzes the instantaneous impact of an unanticipated change in monetary 
policy on the exchange rate and the stock market index. The monetary policy committee 
typically  sets  the  overnight  interest  rate  for  a  month  or  more  (until  the  next  policy 
meeting), meaning that the day before the announcement the expected return on the 
sequence of overnight loans for one month will reflect the expected policy rate over the 
coming month (
P
t m d t i E , 1 1  ; where d denotes days and m denotes months ). Clearly after 
























t i i i E i i i E i i i                ) ( ) ( , 1 1 , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1 1 , 1 , 1       (1) 
 
a
t i   is the anticipated component of the monetary policy change, which should not affect 
financial  markets  on  the  announcement  day,  and 
un
t i  is  the  unanticipated  (surprise) 
element of the policy change on the day of policy announcement, which affects financial 
markets on the day of announcement. As investors must be indifferent between holding 
this sequence of overnight loans for one month and investing at the 1-month market rate 
(
IB
t m i , 1 ), the expectations hypothesis suggests that 1 -month market rate must equal the  
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expected policy rate over the coming month (
P
t m ti E , 1 ), plus a constant term premium (TP), 




t m   , 1 , 1 .
8 Therefore, the surprise element of monetary policy change 













t i TP i E TP i E i E i i            ) ( ) ( , 1 1 , 1 , 1 1 , 1          (2) 
 
Our baseline model, as shown in Equation 3, tests whether  the unanticipated change in 
the monetary policy (
un
t i  ) on the day of the policy announcement affects the financial 
variable ( t f  ) of interest: the exchange rate, e, or the stock market index, s: 
 
s e f i f t
un
t t , ;           .       (3) 
 
To test if policy changes have a different effect during crisis, we estimate Equation 4, 
which adds an interaction term between the unexpected change in monetary policy and 
a crisis dummy variable ( t C d , ) taking a value of one during the global financial crisis and 
0 otherwise.  If monetary policy has a different effect on financial markets during the 
crisis, then  0   . Note that the total effect of policy surprises during the crisis is    . 
As a robustness check,  t C d ,  is also added as an additional variable (Equation 5). Other 
extensions investigating (i) the persistence of monetary policy shocks, (ii) the effect of 
time-varying risk premia and (iii) the efficiency of financial markets are discussed in 
Section 6. 
 




t t , ; . ,                    (4) 
 




t t , , . , ,                      (5) 
 
3.1  Selection of Countries 
 
We extend the sample of developed, small and open economies studied in Kearns and 
Manners (2005)—Australia, NZ, Canada and the UK—to include Indonesia, the Republic 
of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand. Besides allowing the study of monetary policy in these 
Asian economies, doubling the number of countries approximately doubles the number 
of observations during the crisis period. This is crucial given that the definition of the 
crisis period used here typically only includes six observations per country. 
 
We follow Kearns and Manners in selecting countries which have liquid financial markets 
and a credible inflation targeting regime. Admittedly, this is not always possible. Of all 
the major Asian economies considered, only the Republic of Korea and the Philippines 
are classified as independent floaters and follow an inflation targeting framework like the 
                                                 
8  These  conditions can  be derived  by  taking logs  of  the  actual compounded  return  and applying  the 
approximation  ln(1+i)n≈ni  where  n=periods.  Trading-day  and  compounding  rules  complicate  the 
derivation but to not materially affect the expression. 8          |  Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
original  four  developed  economies.
9 The Philippines, however, is not included in th e 
study.  Its  treasury  bill  and  interbank  rates  are  highly  volatile  and  appear  to  be 
disconnected from  the policy  rate ,  which hinders   the  extraction of  any  meaningful 
information. Thailand and Indonesia are  also selected because they are the remaining 
inflation targeters in the region, although the IMF classified them as managed floaters. 
Malaysia is also chosen despite being neither an independent floater nor an inflation 
targeter. It follows a managed floating exchange rate system, but adopts many features 
of the inflation targeting framework. For example, the sequence of policy meetings is set 
in advance on the  central  bank’s  website,  the  policy  instrument  is  well-defined  (the 
overnight policy rate) and monetary policy decisions are publicly announced. Hence, it is 
much easier for the markets to anticipate what decision is (or was) made, and when then 
next one will be—making monetary policy surprises easier to identify. 
 
India, Singapore, Hong Kong, China, the People’s Republic of China (PRC), and Japan 
were considered but not included. India has a managed floating exchange rate regime, 
but it uses various policy instruments, which complicate a clear identification of monetary 
policy  changes.  Singapore  and  Hong  Kong,  China  are  essentially  exchange  rate 
targeters, the former follows an unspecified basket of currency, while the latter has a 
currency board with the US. PRC, on the other hand, uses various policy instruments 
and also pegs its currency against the US dollar. Japan was also excluded due to its 
near zero interest rates over the sample period. 
 
3.2  Crisis Periods 
 
Two crisis periods are used. The standard or narrower one runs from 15 September 
2008 to 15 March 2009. The broader period starts from 1 January 2008 to end-May/June 
2010, the time of data collection.  
 
The standard period in essence captures events during the peak of the global financial 
crisis.
10 It starts from the day when Lehman Brothers filed for Chapter 11 until the trough 
in the MSCI world equity market index.  This period  also saw the rescue of American 
International Group, the failure and takeover of Washington Mutual and Wachovia,  and 
the  near collapse of the money market where the LIBOR and the overnight   indexed 
swap (OIS) spread  rose to over 300 bps.  By January 2009,  financial markets had 
stabilized somewhat, largely as a result of central bank provision of liquidity,  yet the 
crisis was far from over. From January to March 2009, world equity markets fell further, 
bank credit spreads increased, and GDP contracted sharply. It was not until  mid-March 
that some ―green shoots‖ started to appear (according to commentators including the US 
Federal Reserve Chairman Bernanke)
11, and equity markets started to recover.  As such, 
15 March 2009 is the end of the standard crisis period. Practically, late 2008 has too few 
policy decisions to be a useful end-point for the crisis.  
 
                                                 
9  Based on the IMF classification, http://www.imf.org/external/np/mfd/er/2008/eng/0408.htm 
10  It is consistent with Stages 3 and 4 of the global financial crisis, also its peak, as defined by BIS (2009a).  
11  See  US  Federal  Reserve  Chairman  Bernanke’s  remarks,  http://www.npr.org/bogs/mpney/2009/03/ 
bernanke _sees_green_shoots.html  
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The broader crisis starting date of 1 January 2008 is a compromise between June 2007 
and  March  2008,  two  other  potential  starting  dates  used  by  Bank  for  International 
Settlements (2009a,b). This start date recognizes risk aversion and concerns about the 
solvency of financial institutions from the repercussions of the US subprime mortgage 
crisis well before the failure of Lehman Brothers. When it became clear that the US 
housing market had peaked in 2007, market participants began to worry about the value 
of  mortgage  backed  securities  and  their  related  assets,  and  the  solvency  of  highly 
leveraged financial institutions  holding these securities.  Such  concerns  hit new  highs 
when Bear Sterns failed in March 2008 and the credit default swap spreads of many 
financial  institutions  widened  markedly.  The  end-date  is  chosen  to  account  for  the 
overhang of the crisis, where there is still a general pessimism about the state of the 
global recovery. The continued deleveraging process among householders, unresolved 
mortgage  problems,  stubbornly  high  unemployment,  and  lingering  sovereign  debt 
problems are fallouts of the crisis that continue to dent confidence. 
 
3.3  Removal of Outliers 
 
It is important to remove observations when monetary policy might respond to financial 
variables within the observation window (a simultaneity problem)  or  when policy and 
financial variables both respond to the same piece of news (an omitted variable problem) 
(Zettelmeyer 2004). Both the simultaneity and omitted variable problems lead to biased 
estimates. However, for the countries considered here, all have fixed meeting dates, 
typically every month or two. This means a policy change usually reflects news released 
since the last policy meeting, rather than a spontaneous response to news released on 
the  same  day.  As  such,  it  seems  less  important  to  manually  exclude  suspect 
observations. 
 
That said, important events can be influential in small samples, particularly during crisis 
when monetary policy changes are larger and not as well anticipated as usual. This 
implies the outlying observations may be the sole driver of the estimation results. To 
avoid  such  a  risk,  this  paper  follows  Bernanke  and  Kuttner’s  (2005)  method  of 
calculating influence statistics to remove outliers. The influence statistic for a particular 
observation  is
1 '
    bb ,  where  b  is  the  change  in  the  estimated  coefficient  vector 
when a particular observation is excluded from the regression, and   is the estimated 
variance-covariance matrix of the original regression on the full sample. The influence 
statistic is always positive (due to the quadratic form) and will be close to zero when the 
coefficients do not change much from the exclusion of a particular observation, or when 
the coefficients are imprecisely estimated (a ―small‖  1    ). Bernanke and Kuttner (2005) 
plot  the  distribution  of  influence  statistics  and  exclude  those  observations  with  an 
influence statistic greater than 0.3. In this paper, 0.3 is also used as a cut off. Although it 
is somewhat arbitrary, it turns out that the 0.3 benchmark removes only a few of the 
most influential observations in each regression— never more than three. Most of the 
observations removed have influence statistics that are so large that they would have 
been removed under any reasonable metric (see Table A1). Fixing the 0.3 benchmark 
also  safeguards  against  data  mining,  which  is  always  a  concern  when  excluding 
observations.  
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The size of some of the influence statistics shows how critical it is to exclude outliers. In 
some cases, an influential observation is excluded because financial market movements 
are clearly caused by a third factor. For example, in Thailand, 3 December 2008 was the 
date of the largest ever cut in rates by a largely unanticipated 100 bps, but also the 
reopening  of  Bangkok's  Suvarnabhumi  airport  after  a  week-long  sit  in  by  anti-
government protesters.
12 However, in others cases, there is no clear news event driving 
an outlier or there is some ambiguity in terms of timing. For example, on 12 December 
2008, Bank of Korea (BOK) announced new and expanded foreign exchange swap lines 
with PRC and Japan. It happened after the day of  an influential observation which saw 
the  policy  rate  cut  by  100  bps,  but  the  exchange  rate  appreciated  by  2.5%.  Yet 
discussions on the swap arrangements would have been conducted beforehand and as 
such the announcement  would have been anticipated.  Hence, sometimes, it may be 
difficult to judge on news alone whether the influential observation can be excluded.
13  
 
As a robustness  check, a robust  regression algorithm is also employed.
14 The robust 
method has two disadvantages: heteroskedasticity robust standar d errors cannot be 
used (as the observations have already been reweighted); and it is difficult to summarize 
the  reweighting  mechanism,  which  is  why  the  main  results  are  presented  using 
Bernanke and Kuttner’s (2005) approach.  
 
While noise in financial variables will not affect estimates in large samples,  if macro 
variables such as GDP and consumer price index are partially known by the central bank 
(and so influence policy), but may not be known by the markets, then the estimates can 
be biased. For Australia, timing conventions make this potentially a large problem—GDP 
was released on the same day as the monetary policy decision in 30 out of the 137 
decisions  considered.  However,  the  exclusion  of  these  observations  does  not 
significantly affect results for Australia (not reported). For Malaysia, on nine out of the 43 
monetary policy release dates, the central bank released GDP estimates at the same 
time as the monetary policy decision.
15 Excluding these observations does not materially 
affect the estimates.
16  
                                                 
12  See http://www.timesonline.co.uk/tol/news/world/asia/article5277798.ece. The Baht rallied in response 
to this news, as the closure of the airport had crippled Thailand’s tourist industry, a major export earner. 
This observation has a high influence statistic because it is an outlier in terms of the dependent and 
independent variable.  
13  Possible further work is to investigate outliers using a shorter event window. 
14  This is done via Stata’s rreg command. The algorithm initially screens for outliers using Cook’s distance 
greater than one as a threshold. It then uses two iterative procedures (Huber weights and a biweight 
method)  to  down  weigh  influential  observations  and  then  re-estimates  influential  observations,  as 
suggested by Li (1985). Monte Carlo simulations by Hamilton (1991) suggest that this robust regression 
is almost (95%) as efficient as ordinary least squares (OLS) with ideal data (normal errors, fixed X), but 
more than twice as efficient with fat tailed errors and random X which would best describe the data used 
here. 
15  Bank  Negara  Malaysia  (BNM)  announces  the  GDP  in  its  quarterly  ―Economic  and  Financial 
Developments in the Malaysian Economy‖ press releases.  
16  Further work can be extended to investigate this issue for the other six countries.  
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4.  Data 
 
Policy rates, market interest rates, exchange rates and stock price data are collected for 
the eight countries. Table 1 lists the policy rates and their sample sizes. The sample size 
for each country corresponds to the longest available series conditional on a relatively 
constant monetary policy framework over the sample. Each observation in the sample is 
a monetary policy decision, not a policy change as in some other studies. As the non-
OECD countries in the sample adopted inflation targeting after the OECD countries, their 
sample sizes are smaller than that of the OECD countries. As such, pooled results are 
often more closer to the  results  of the OECD countries. The number of decisions is 
reasonable for all countries, although the number of policy changes is very small for 
Malaysia. In each country, the sample size is small in the standard crisis period. As such, 
each  individual  country’s  estimates  during  the crisis  should  be  interpreted  with  care. 
Pooling across all countries, however, gives 35 policy changes (40 decisions), which 
may  be  large  enough  to  produce  reliable  econometric  estimates.  In  the  broad  crisis 
period, the number is larger —70 policy changes (194 decisions).  
 
The market interest rates for Indonesia, the Republic of Korea, Malaysia and Thailand 
are the interbank offered rates in each country. For Australia, Canada, NZ and the UK, 
we  follow  Kearns  and  Manners  (2005)  in  using  the  bank  bill,  bankers’  acceptances, 
wholesale bill and LIBOR rates, respectively. The exchange rates are nominal exchange 
rates, US dollar per local currency, such that an increase reflects of an appreciation of 
the  local  currency.  The  stock  price  indexes  are  the  main  stock  price  index  in  each 
country. (Details of the data collected, sources and timing of the policy changes are 
reported in Table A2).  
 
Great care needs to be taken with timing. In some countries, such as Malaysia,  the 
policy announcement is at 6 pm local time, after markets have closed. This means the 
one-day change in the interbank rate, exchange rate and stock index need to be lagged 
by a day. In Canada, a 9 am decision time means no lags are needed. Sometimes some 
market prices are sampled before the announcement, and some after. For example, in 
the UK, the LIBOR rate is quoted at 11 am, before the monetary policy announcement, 
usually,  at  12  pm  (a  one  day  lag)  whereas  exchange  rates  and  stock  prices  are 
measured in the night and afternoon respectively.
17 For most countries, the timing is 
clear from the data source. However, for  the  Republic of Korea,  interbank rates are 
sampled at around the same time as the policy announcement (10.40–11 am local time), 
and so the timing is determined graphically. For most of the countries, market interest 
rates move closely with the policy rate on the day of the announcement, but do not 
respond with a one-day lag—suggesting no lag is needed.
18  
 
                                                 
17  In Australia, the timing of monetary policy announcement changed from Wednesdays to Tuesdays in 
February 2008. 
18  Until March 2006, the interbank rate seemed to respond more strongly to policy changes with a one day 
lag. We were unable to find any information on whether the procedures of Korean Federation of Banks, 
who collects the data, had changed around this period. However, excluding observations before March 
2006 do not affect key results of the paper (see Section 5.4 Other Robustness Tests for more details). 12          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
4.1  Data Issues in Asian Countries 
 
The  data  used for  Australia,  Canada,  NZ  and  the  UK  are  uncontroversial.  However, 
Indonesia, Thailand and the Republic of Korea have changed their policy instruments in 
recent years, and liquidity operations by the central banks may have affected the market 
interest rates, thus adding noise to the measure of monetary surprise.  
 
In Indonesia, for example, changes to Bank Indonesia’s (BI) standing facilities (Fasilitas 
Bank Indonesia, FASBI) may have affected the policy (BI) rate and/or the interbank rates 
in  ways  unfamiliar  to  us,  which  may  warrant  further  investigation.  Under  the  current 
arrangement, BI lends to (borrows from) commercial banks at the BI rate +(–) 50 bps.
 19 
However in June 2006, the overnight FASBI rate for deposits was set at the BI rate –5 




In Thailand, the  target policy rate has  undergone several changes, which may  have 
affected the measurement of  expectations from the 1 -month interbank rate.  The first 
reform in January 2007 changed the policy instrument from  14-day repo rate to the 1-
day repo rate primarily to reduce volatility. The second reform was the decentralization 
of the repo market , where  previously the Bank of Thailand was the principal broker . 
Other  reforms  included  changing  the  timing  of  reserve  maintenance  periods  and 
establishing a ±50 bps borrowing and lending window around the policy rate to prevent 
volatility.  
 
In the Republic of Korea, too, there was a major change in the  target policy rate. In 
March  2008,  BOK  changed  the  target  policy  rate  from  the  call  rate  (the  rate  on 
uncollateralized loan from commercial banks to th e central bank) to the Bank o f Korea 
base  rate,  which  is  ―the  reference  rate  applied  in  transactions  such  as  repurchase 
agreements  between  the  bank  and  counterpart  financial  institutions‖  (Bank  of  Korea 
2008). This was to address the disconnect between the call rate, which was fixed at the 
target, and other short-term interest rates. The change is envisioned to lead to a more 
liquid  short-term  interbank  market  and  hence  interbank  rates  that  better  reflect 
expectations.  
                                                                                                                                                                         
4.2  Descriptive Statistics 
 
Table 2 presents the average absolute value of each of the variables on the day of the 
monetary policy announcement or  the  day after, depending on timing issues. For all 
countries  except  Malaysia,  the  absolute  change  in  the  1-month  market  interest  rate 
) (
un
t i  is  much  smaller  than  the  change  in  the policy  rate  ). (
P
t i   This  shows  that,  in 
general, markets predict most of the monetary policy changes—perfect surprises would 
                                                 
19  See  Bank  Indonesia’s  webpage,  http://www.bi.go.id/web/en/Moneter/Operasi+Moneter/Standing+  
Facilities/ 
20  See  Asian  Bonds  Online’s  webpage,  http://asianbondsonline.adb.org/indonesia/structure/buying_  
selling/description.php  
The Impact of Monetary Policy on Financial Markets in Small Open Economies: |       13 
More or Less Effective During the Global Financial Crisis? 
 
have  the  same  two  values,  whereas  perfectly  anticipated  changes  would  have  the 
change in market interest rates (monetary policy surprise) close to zero. The average 
surprise is also quite small—about five bps for OECD countries and 7.5 bps for non-
OECD  countries.  This  should  be  kept  in  mind  when  interpreting  the  results:  a  point 
estimate  of  one  (β=1)  in  the  regressions  below  would  mean  that  a  monetary  policy 
surprise only moved markets by 0.05%. The average change in the expected future 2-
month rate  ) ( ,
un
t F i  is typically similar to the change in the 1-month rate. This means on 
average a monetary policy surprise changes the level of interest rates going forward, 
rather  than  just  changing  the  timing  of  rates, at  least  out  to  three  months.  For  all 
countries,  except  Australia  and  NZ,  the  stock  markets  are  more  volatile  than  the 
exchange rates; the difference is particularly large for the developing countries.  
 
Using the standard crisis period, the right side of Table 2 characterizes policy during the 
crisis as much more volatile than before the crisis. The average policy decision shows a 
much greater change in the policy rate—around six times greater (than the full sample) 
for  OECD  countries  and,  three  times  greater  for  non-OECD  countries.  However, 
movements  in  market  interest  rates  are much larger  too—five  times  larger  in  OECD 
countries, and four times larger in non-OECD countries. Changes in the expected future 
2-month rates are similar to changes in the 1-month rates, providing some evidence that, 
as before, most rate changes shift the level of rates, rather than merely changing the 
timing of rates changes over coming months.
21  
 
Figures  1  to  8  show the policy change on meeting dates for each country, and the 
change in the  market interest rate (the monetary surprise measure). The first thing to 
note is that the size of cuts in the policy rate during the crisis is unprecedented in recent 
history for all countries ,  except Indonesia and Canada.  This can lead to unreliable 
estimates in small samples. For example, the first rate cut during the crisis, such as, the 
1.5 percentage point rate cut on 6 November 2008  in the UK, or the  one percentage 
point cut in October 2008 in Australia, is a long way from the  average changes in their 
respective  market  interest  rates. So,  if there are extreme movements  in the stock 
markets and/or the exchange rates on the same day (as they are likely during the crisis), 
then the observations become extremely influential.  
 
For developed countries, it is easy to spot the unanticipated (surprise)  and anticipated 
component of policy rate changes—the latter being the difference between the policy 
rate  and  the  market  interest  rate  changes.  As  seen  in  Figure  1,  Australian  policy 
decisions  were  generally  well  anticipated  by  markets—the  bank  bill  rate  (monetary 
surprise) changes were small. Most of the time, a 25 bps spike in the policy rate barely 
moved the bank bill rate, for example, on 2 March 2005. Sometime markets expected a 
rate change that did not happen. For example, on 6 April 2005, when markets thought 
there was a 60% chance of a change, and the bank bill rate moved, but the policy rate 
did not. Sometimes policy changes surprised the market, and so bank bill rates moved 
with the policy rate, such as on 2 December 1998. Looking across a range of countries, 
one striking feature of the global financial crisis is that central banks responded to the 
                                                 
21  The exception is NZ, which has a larger change in expected 2-month interest rate than 1-month interest 
rate. This might be due to movements in risk premia during the crisis (discussed in more detail later). 14          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
crisis much more strongly than what markets anticipated. For Australia, only half of the 
first interest rate cut was anticipated by markets.  
 
The  policy  response  to  the  crisis  for  most  of  the  Asian  countries  was  large  and 
somewhat unanticipated by markets. For example, Thailand cut rates by one percentage 
point in October 2008, and about three-quarters of this was unexpected. The majority of 
the policy change was also unexpected in the Republic of Korea. Monetary policy in 
Indonesia and Malaysia did not respond as fast to the crisis. The first rate move by Bank 
Indonesia  after  the  failure  of  Lehman  Brothers  was  in  fact  a  25  bps  rate  rise  on  7 
October 2008, while Bank Negara Malaysia only cut rates on 24 November 2008 by only 
25 bps. It was not until January 2009 that both central banks cut rates aggressively, 
which was largely unexpected by their respective interbank markets.  
 
Looking over the whole sample, interbank markets and monetary policy operate quite 
differently in different Asian countries. In Malaysia, there were few changes in monetary 
policy. Movements in the interbank rates suggest there was almost no anticipation by the 
market of policy changes (Figure 7). This may be a result of the infrequent rate changes 
by the central bank—when rates do change, they tend to surprise the market. In contrast, 
Indonesia (Figure 5) experienced many rate changes, but most changes took the market 
by surprise, except the rate cuts in late 2006. In Thailand, most rate rises were at least 
partially anticipated by the interbank market, such as rate rises in 2005–06, and the 
market half anticipated rate cuts in 2003. Bank of Thailand (2007) reports that ―during 
the  second  half  of  2005  …  market  players  strongly  expected  the  [Monetary  Policy 
Committee] MPC to raise the policy rate‖, which corroborates the evidence from Figure 8 
that the rate raises in late 2005 were well anticipated.  
 
 
5.  Results 
 
The  main  results  are  presented  in  Table  3.  The  first  two  columns  are  results  from 
Equation 3, and the rest of the columns from Equation 4, which includes an interaction 
crisis  dummy  based  on  either  the  standard  or  broad  crisis  period.  The  results  here 
exclude observations whose influence statistics are greater than 0.3.  
 
5.1  Baseline (Without Crisis Interaction Term) 
 
From the first column of Table 3, Panel A, across all countries in the sample, a 100 bps 
monetary  surprise  raises  the  exchange  rate  by  around  1.1%  and  is  statistically 
significant.  For  the  OECD  group,  its  pooled  regression  shows  a  100  bps  monetary 
surprise leads to a statistically significant appreciation of around 1.4%. All (except the 
Republic of Korea) report a positive and statistically significant effect. For most of these 
countries, the estimated coefficients are in the range of 1–3%, similar to Kearns and 
Manners  (2005),  at  the  lower  end,  and  Zettelmeyer  (2004),  at  the  higher  end.  The 
coefficient for Australia is much larger than for the other OECD countries and more than 
double the estimates presented by Kearns and Manners (2005). While an estimate of 
5.4  might  seem  unrealistically  large  (a  100  bps  surprise  leads  to  a  5.4  percent 
appreciation),  it  is  important  to  note  that  a  typical  monetary  policy  surprise  is  very 
small—the mean absolute surprise is only 4 bps. As such, the mean response of the  
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exchange rate is only 0.2%, which is highly plausible.
22 The insignificant result for  the 
Republic of Korea is due to the exclusion of several influential observations and the 
exact size of the cut-off. For example, with an influence cut-off of one (rather than 0.3), 
the coefficient on the exchange rate is positive (2.1) and significant at the 5% level.  
 
The  non-OECD countries in the sample ( Indonesia,  Malaysia  and  Thailand) have a 
coefficient of around  0–0.5  (a  100  bps  surprise  appreciates  the  exchange  rate  by 
0.5%)—less  than  half  of  most  of  the  OECD  countries.
23 To  some  extent  a  small 
coefficient is not a surprise as  the exchange rates of all three are  only partially market 
determined—a  managed  float  rather  than  a  free  float.  As  such,  actual,  perceived  or 
possible interventions might weaken the link between policy  surprises and  exchange 
rate. The sample sizes for these countries are also smaller.  
 
Results from Panel B shows a 100 bps monetary surprise cut leads to a stock market 
rally  of  1%  in  the  pooled  OECD  regression  and  1.5%  in  the  pooled  non-OECD 
regression.  The  size  of  the  coefficient  is  smaller  than  the  estimate  produced  by 
Bernanke  and  Kuttner  (2005)  for  the  US,  although  not  substantially  so  when  they 
remove the outliers. Individually, a surprise cut raise stock prices in most countries, but 
only in Malaysia and NZ are the coefficients statistically significant.   
 
Even when influential observations are included, the baseline results are fairly similar for 
most  countries  (Table  A3).  For  example,  apart  from  larger  standard  errors,  the 
coefficient  for  Australia  in  the  exchange  rate  regression  is  much  smaller  (0.5  and 
insignificant, rather than 5.4 and significant without outliers), due to the inclusion of the 
October and November 2008 outliers. On these two days, the Reserve Bank of Australia 
cut  rates  sharply  (larger  than  was  anticipated  by  markets)  and  the  exchange  rate 
appreciated sharply by 1% and 2.65% respectively. The other big change is the UK for 
the stock market regression, where the inclusion of the 6 November 2008 observation 
moves the estimated coefficient from –0.6 to +2—this was the date of the big rate cut in 
the UK, but stock markets fell by 5%. The observation for the Republic of Korea on 11 
Dec 2008 (when rates were cut by 1% but the exchange rate appreciated by 2.5%) is 
also extremely influential.  
 
A robust regression, an alternative way of down weighting influential observations (Table 
A4) produces very similar coefficients to those in Table 3. This shows that the results are 
not sensitive to the specific methodology of excluding outliers.  
 
5.2  Monetary Policy with Interaction Crisis Dummy 
The second and third sets of columns in Table 3 report the effect of a surprise change in 
monetary policy on exchange rates and stock markets during crisis (Equation 2). Here 
the crisis dummy is interacted with the monetary surprise variable taking a value of one 
for  the  period,  15  September  2008  to  15  March  2009  (standard  crisis  period)  or  1 
                                                 
22  The first rate cut of the crisis was a –50 bps surprise, which with a coefficient of five would suggest a 
2.5% depreciation of the Australian dollar. 
23  The Malaysian coefficient is not statistically significant from zero. 16          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
January 2008 to May/June 2010 (broad crisis period), and zero otherwise. The same 
influential observations (calculated based on Equation 1) are excluded as in the baseline 
regression. Redefining influential observations under the standard crisis period produced 
implausible  results  for  individual  countries—more  crisis  observations  were  deemed 
influential,  further  reducing  the  sample  size  during  the  crisis  (see  below  for  further 
discussion). γ is the coefficient of interest.  
 
For  the  exchange  rate  regressions  (Panel  A),  the  interaction  term  is  generally 
insignificant.  It  should  be  noted  that  for  any  particular  country,  the  number  of 
observations during the crisis is small—less than six per country for the standard crisis 
period—readers should not place too much weight on these individual country results. In 
contrast,  the  different  pooled  regressions  have  a  reasonable  number  of  crisis 
observations  (up  to  40  across  all  countries)  and  so  are  more  reliable.  The  pooled 
regressions suggest a significantly weaker effect of policy on exchange rates during the 
crisis compared with outside the crisis, but only during the standard crisis period. It turns 
out that these results are not robust to using the longer (broad) definition of the crisis.  
 
For the stock market regressions in Panel B, all individual countries (with the exception 
of Thailand) have an insignificant interaction term. The pooled OECD regression shows 
monetary surprise has no significant impact during the crisis. For the pooled non-OECD 
regression,  the  interaction  term  is  negative  and  significant  under  both  crisis  periods, 
suggesting that policy might have a stronger effect on the stock market during the crisis. 
Thailand  is  very  influential  in  this  regression.  If  Thailand  is  excluded,  the  combined 
Malaysian-Indonesian  coefficient  is  not  significant.  However,  the  significance  of  the 
Malaysian-Indonesian coefficient is sensitive to influential observations and whether a 
crisis dummy variable is included (to be discussed in the next section).  
 
5.3  Influential Observations and Dummy Variables During the Crisis 
 
Two criticisms of the above results are apparent and are dealt with in Table 4. First, 
influential observations are removed before the interaction term is included. As many of 
the influential observations are found during the crisis, it is possible that we might have 
removed the very observations that drive a different effect of monetary policy during the 
crisis. Second, a dummy variable for the crisis is not included, only the interaction term is 
included. This imposes the restriction that average change in the financial variable on a 
day during the crisis is the same as the average change on a day outside the crisis, 
which seems unlikely.  
 
Table 4 adds a crisis dummy to Equation 4 in Table 3 for the three pooled regressions—
we  now  estimate  Equation  5.  All  observations  are  taken  into  account  (including 
influential  observations)  to  make  sure  that  results  are  not  driven  by  excluded 
observations during the crisis. Results for individual countries are not reported—it is not 
meaningful to explain less than six crisis observations with two variables.  
 
Overall, the inclusion of the crisis dummy variable does not seem to be essential. For 
both  the  OECD  and  non-OECD  samples,  the  crisis  dummy  variable  is  usually 
insignificant—only significant in the stock market regressions under the standard crisis 
period. That said, in terms of the impact of monetary policy (γ) during crisis on exchange  
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rates (Panel A), compared to the pooled results from Table 3, both the OECD and non-
OECD pooled regressions now show an insignificant policy impact in the standard crisis 
period. On the other hand, the stronger effect of monetary policy on stock markets for 
the non-OECD countries remains robust in both crisis periods. In another regression (not 
reported),  the  effect  of  policy  on  stock  markets  for  the  non-OECD  countries  are  no 
longer driven just by Thailand, giving a sense of robustness.
24  
 
Similar results are obtained  from regressions with  different combinations  of the crisis 
dummy and influential observations, such as (i)  crisis dummy and the excluded original 
influential observations calculated using Equation 3; (ii) crisis dummy and the excluded 
new influential observations calculated using Equation 5 with a cut off of 0.3; and (iii) no 
crisis dummy but influential observations calculated using Equation 5 with a cutoff raised 
or lowered to keep the number of influential observations the same in aggregate.
 25  
 
5.4  Other Robustness Tests 
 
Table  A3  shows  the  same  regressions  as  Table  3,  but  without  removing  influential 
observations.  Many  individual  country  estimates  of  γ  are  quite  different,  such  as  for 
Australia, stressing that these are small sample results that are very sensitive to outliers. 
Most  pooled results  are  similar to  those  in Table  3,  except that  policy  in  the OECD 
countries during the standard crisis period has a significantly weaker effect on financial 
markets—a more negative effect on exchange rates and more positive effect on stock 
markets. However, as these results are driven by a few outliers, too much weight should 
not be put on them. 
 
Robust  regressions  (Table  A4)  produce  broadly  similar  results  to  Table  3.  Results 
confirmed are that (i) the effect of policy surprises on exchange rates during the crisis (γ) 
is never significant during the broad crisis period, but is sometimes or weakly significant 
during the standard crisis period; and (ii) the effect of policy surprises on stock markets 
is  stronger  for  the  non-OECD  countries,  but  not  for  the  OECD  countries.  While  the 
interaction  coefficient for  the  broad  crisis  period  is  no  longer  significant  for  the  non-
OECD  countries,  the  estimated  coefficient  (–2.06)  is  very  similar  to  that  in  Table  3          
(–1.78) or Table 4 (–2.56). 
26  
 
Instead of classifying countries into OECD and non-OECD groups, countries can also be 
classified as Western and Asian. This involves moving the Republic of Korea from the 
                                                 
24  That is, when Equation 5 is estimated using the pooled data from only Malaysia and Indonesia, the 
interaction term is still negative and significant, but only in the standard crisis period. 
25    Cutoffs  cannot  be  compared  across  models  as  adding  additional  variables  can  increase  or  lower 
influence statistics. Instead, we raised or lowered the cutoff until the number of observations excluded 
calculated based on Equation 5 is the same as the number of observations excluded calculated based 
on Equation 3. 
26  Not much weight should be put on small differences in significance across the estimation methods. The 
robust  estimates  do  not  have  heteroskedasticity  robust  standard  errors  because  observations  have 
already been reweighted. For OLS regressions in Table 3 or Table 4, robust standard errors are about 
40% smaller than non-robust standard errors (not reported).   18          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
OECD group to the Asian group. As the Republic of Korea has less developed financial 
markets than the other Western countries, is newly industrialized and has more recent 
changes to its monetary policy framework, there is some justification for the alternative 
grouping.  
 
Reclassifying the Republic of Korea into the Asian group changes the interpretation of 
some results. First, it provides more support for the case that policy has a statistically 
significantly weaker effect on exchange rates for Western countries during the crisis—
the negative γ interaction term in the equivalent of Tables 3 and 4 are now significant at 
the 5 percent level for the standard crisis period (not reported). Second, it provides less 
support for the case that policy in Asian countries has a statistically significant stronger 
impact on stock markets during the crisis—the negative γ interaction term in Tables 3 
and 4 for the Asian countries in the stock market regressions is significant less often. 
These results are to be expected given the small and insignificant γ interaction term for 




6.  Extensions 
 
6.1  Persistence of Monetary Policy Shocks 
 
The monetary  surprise captured  by  the  change  in  1-month  market  interest  rate  only 
indicates a change in the expectation of the policy rate over the coming month, it says 
nothing about the change in the expectation of the policy rate further in the future. At one 
end  of  the  spectrum,  a  rate  rise  might  have  no  effect  on  expected  future  rate.  For 
example, markets might have expected a rate rise this month or next (a timing surprise) 
and so the rate rise only changes expectation of interest rates over the coming month. 
On the other hand, a rate rise may not have been expected at all (and is expected to be 
relatively permanent) and so a 25 bps surprise raises this month’s and next month’s rate 
expectations by 25 bps (a levels surprise).  If the rate rise is seen by markets as the start 
of a tightening cycle, then expectations of future rate rises further out may increase even 
more. Hence, levels surprises should have a larger effect on stock prices and exchange 
rates than timing surprises.  
 
The definition of the change in expected future rates ( ,
un
Ft i  )used here is the expected 
change  in  the  policy  rate  over  two  months  beginning  one  month  in  the  future, 
P
m t m d t
P
m t m t
un
t F i E i E i 1 , 2 1 1 , 2 ,      .
28  Ideally  expectations  about  future  interest  rates  can  be 
                                                 
27  More specifically: (i) in the pooled Western country’s exchange rate regressions, equivalent to Tables 3 
and 4, the negative γ interaction term is now significant at the 5% level for the standard crisis period, but 
not the broad crisis period; and (ii) in the pooled Asian country’s stock market regressions, the negative 
γ interaction term is now insignificant in the equivalent of Table 3 ( for both crisis periods ) and in the 
equivalent of Table 4 ( for the broad crisis period ).  
28  For  example,  for  a  monetary  policy  decision  on  1  January,  ,
un
Ft i  is  the  difference  between  the 
expectation of the average policy rate during February and March formed on 1 January, and expectation 
of the average policy rate during February and March formed on 31 December.  
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backed out from the futures market as in Kearns and Manners (2005). However, these 
data are not available for all the countries considered here. Instead, we can use readily 
available 3-month and 1-month interbank rates as the expected future two-month rate is 
related to the slope of the yield curve between maturities of 3-month to 1-month (by the 
expectations hypothesis). Applying similar steps as in Section 3 yields the measure of 
the expected future policy change (Equation 6). Equation 7 is the estimated equation 
that adds the future rate surprise ( ,
un
Ft i  ) to Equation 3. A 100 bps pure timing surprise 
will raise  un
t i   by 100 bps but leave  ,
un
Ft i   unchanged, and so will increase stock markets 
or exchange rates by β%. But a pure levels surprise of 100 bps will raise both  un
t i   and 
,
un










               (6) 




t t , , ,                        (7) 
Table 5 presents the results of timing and levels surprises. For the OECD countries, the 
levels surprises matter more than the timing surprises in both the exchange rate and 
stock market regressions. For the exchange rate regressions, the levels surprise is large 
and  significant  in  Australia,  Canada,  NZ  and  the  UK,  while  the  timing  surprise  is 
insignificant, as found by Kearns and Manners (2005). For the stock market regressions, 
results for these countries are more mixed. The levels surprise is only significant in NZ 
and Canada, while the timing surprise is significant in the UK.  
 
For the pooled non-OECD regressions, the levels surprise is important for stock prices, 
but  not  for  exchange  rates.  Individually,  only  Malaysia  records  a  significant  levels 
surprise in the stock market regression.  
 
That said, to some extent, Equation 7 may have difficulty distinguishing between levels 
and  timing  effects  as  current  and  future  interest  rate  surprises tend  to  be  positively 
correlated (Figure 9). 
 
6.2  Changing Risk Premium During Crisis 
 
One defining feature of the crisis is the inability of banks to borrow cheaply from the 
interbank and money markets. This is reflected in the markedly higher spread of the 
interbank and money market interest rates over the OIS (which involves no change of 
principal and so have less credit risk). This study has used the market (interbank and 
bank bill) interest rates as they are available in all countries, although OIS spreads are 
arguably a better measure of policy expectations.  
 
The rise in liquidity/risk premium on the interbank rates and similar market interest rates 
may affect the estimated results in a number of ways. First, if the risk premium is fairly 
constant on the days of monetary policy decisions, it will be differenced out and has no 
effect on the estimates. Second, if the risk premium is independent noise added to the 
market interest rates, the 1-month change in market interest rates will suffer from the 
classical  measurement  error.  This  biases  the  coefficient  on  the  change  in  1-month 
( ,
un
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market interest rates toward zero. Finally, if the change in the policy rate is somehow 
correlated with the size of the risk premium, then estimates during the crisis can be 
biased and inconsistent. This can happen if both the unexpected policy rate cuts and 
rising risk premium are caused by disruption in financial markets. One way to separate 
risk premium from expectations is to use OIS.  
 
As OIS are not available in most countries, Australia’s experience is used to assess 
whether the changing risk premium is empirically important. Figure 10 shows the daily 
spread of 1-month bank bill rate over 1-month OIS rate; usually the spread is around 10 
bps, although during the crisis it was much larger and more volatile, up to 70 bps. Figure 
11 shows the change in the 1-month bank bill rate and the change in the 1-month OIS 
rate on the days of monetary policy announcements. Encouragingly, for most parts, the 
change  in  the  OIS  rate  gives  an  almost  identical  measure  of  monetary  surprises. 
Although during the peak of the crisis, the size of monetary surprise is quite different. For 
example, the November 2008 surprise is –17.5 bps as measured by the OIS rate, but     
–42 bps for the 1-month bank bill rate. 
 
If Equation 3 is re-estimated for Australia using the OIS rate rather than the bank bill rate 
over a common sample (different from the one in Table 3), the coefficient (and t-statistic) 
changes from  5.25  (4.07)  to  4.56 (4.33) for  the  exchange rate  regression,  and from        
–0.19  (–0.18)  to  –1.41(–1.02)  for  the  stock  market  regression—both  insignificant 
changes.
 29 When the crisis interaction term is added (Equation 4) based on the broad 
crisis period, the estimated coefficient is still statistically insignificant.
 30  As such, there is 
some evidence that the results, at least for the full sample and broad crisis period, do not 
seem to be sensitive to the use of bank bills rather than OIS. 
 
6.3  Efficiency of Interbank and Money Markets 
 
Rational  expectations  suggest  that  anticipated  changes  in  policy  rates  should  have 
already been ―priced into‖ financial assets. As such, in this paper, the monetary policy 
surprise  is  used  as  an  explanatory  variable.  However,  if  financial  markets  are  not 
―efficient‖, or changes in expectations are poorly measured by the 1-month change in 
market interest rates, then the anticipated component of the policy change could still 
affect markets. To test this, Equation 8 adds the anticipated change in the policy rate 
(
a
t i  ) to the baseline model (Equation 3). Markets are ―efficient‖ if  0   . 




t t , ,                        (8) 
Results presented in Table 6 suggest that for most OECD countries, markets are fairly 
efficient—to the extent that they only respond to policy surprises. Exceptions are the 
Republic of Korea, where θ is significant in the exchange rate regression, and the UK, 
                                                 
29    The  common  sample  is  the  days  of  monetary  announcements  from  4  July  2001  to  1  June  2010 
excluding outliers on 8 October 2008 and 4 November 2008 identified earlier. This sample is shorter 
than  the  sample  used  in  Table  3  for  Australia  (which  starts  in  1998)  because  OIS  rates  are  only 
available on the RBA website from mid-2001. 
30 Over the standard crisis period, the results are not robust due to small sample, where one variable 
explains five crisis observations. For example, the exclusion of one observation changes the coefficient 
on the interaction term from significantly positive to significantly negative.  
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where anticipated rate raises stock prices. For the Republic of Korea, this might reflect 
measurement issues, as removing observations before March 2006, which might have 
different timing (see footnote 18) makes θ insignificant. For the UK, this might reflect 
some spurious correlation as θ has the wrong sign.  
 
On the other hand, for the non-OECD countries, there is less evidence supporting an 
efficient  interbank  and  money  market.  In  particular,  in  the  individual  stock  market 
regressions,  θ  is  often  large,  correctly  signed  and  significant,  while  β  (the  monetary 
surprise coefficient) is not.  
 
 
7.  Conclusions 
 
How  monetary  policy  affects  the  economy  is  of  key  interest  to  policymakers  during 
normal times and even more so during times of crisis. This paper uses an event study 
approach to estimate the effect of monetary policy shocks on stock markets (the first 
stage of the wealth channel) and exchange rates (which affect net exports) for eight 
small open (OECD and non-OECD) economies. It also asks whether the impact of policy 
is any different during crisis. To the knowledge of the authors, this is the first paper that 
uses this approach for monetary policy shocks in Asia,
31 and one of few papers which try 
to estimate the effect of monetary policy during crisis. 
 
Overall, an unanticipated 100 bps increase in the policy rate causes the exchange rate 
to appreciate by about 1%, and stock prices to fall by 1%. The effect on exchange rates 
is  notably  weaker  in  the  non-OECD  countries  examined  here,  all  of  which  have  a 
managed float as against a free-float regime in the OECD countries.  For the OECD 
countries (and exchange rate regressions), there is no robust evidence that monetary 
policy is more or less effective during the global financial crisis. However for the non-
OECD countries, a monetary policy shock has a larger effect on the stock market during 
the crisis than outside the crisis. This effect seems to be reasonably robust to a range of 
specifications and econometric methodologies. 
 
The key question then is whether monetary policy is actually more effective for the non-
OECD  countries  during  the  crisis,  or  whether  its  effect  is  just  easier  to  detect 
econometrically.  After all, these models suggest that effect of policy on stock markets 
(for the non-OECD countries) is close to zero before the crisis—contrary to theory. One 
reason  might  be  that  interbank  rates  are  a  noisy  measure  of  monetary  policy 
expectations.  If  in  normal  times  monetary  policy  does  not  change  very  much,  the    
noise–to–signal ratio may be quite high, leading to attenuation bias in the estimates (if 
the measurement error of expectations is classical). However, during the crisis all central 
banks made large changes to monetary policy, the size of which generally surprised the 
                                                 
31  Though there are a number of papers estimating the effect of US monetary policy on stock markets in 
Asia such  as Wongswan (2009). 22          | Working Paper Series on Regional Economic Integration No. 72 
 
 
market. For these crisis observations, the noise-to-signal ratio could have been lower, 
allowing a cleaner estimate of the effect of policy shocks on stock markets.
32  
 
Further research is needed to clearly establish whether policy is really more effective 
during  the  crisis.  First,  the  root  of  the  problem—classical  measurement  error  of 
expectations— can be addressed by trying an alternative measure of expectations. One 
possibility  is  to  use  surveys  of  economists  before  a  monetary  policy  meeting  by 
newswire  services  like  Bloomberg.  The  sample  will  most  likely  be  short  and  even 
exclude some countries, but it may be informative about how noisy are the measures of 
expectations using interbank rates. Second, shorter event windows as in Kearns and 
Manners 2005 can be tried for countries with available data. While this does not solve 
the  measurement  error  problem,  it  may  otherwise  increase  the  accuracy  of  the 
estimation.  Third,  the  issue  can  be  tackled  econometrically.  For  example,  one  could 
instrument for the change in expectations, remove observations where liquidity in the 
interbank market is low (and so prices may not reflect expectations) or add measures of 
market  liquidity  to  the  regression.  An  alternative  approach  is  to  exploit  the  greater 
variance  of  the  expectations  component  of  interbank  rates  on  the  days  of  monetary 
policy announcements to isolate causality, an approach related to that of Rigobon and 
Sack (2004). Finally, more countries can be added to the sample. If the effect of policy 
on stock markets during the crisis is really stronger in the non-OECD countries, then 
similar results in other non-OECD countries may be found. For example, the paper can 
be extended to include Middle Eastern countries, Latin American countries or Eastern 
European countries with a similar monetary regime.  
 
                                                 
32  Volatility of the liquidity premium in the interbank markets also increased during the crisis. But as long 
as the size of the signal rose relative to the noise, the attenuation bias will still be smaller during the 
crisis.   
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 Table 1: Policy Rate and Number of Policy Changes (Decisions) 
 
Country  Policy Rate  Sample 
 









           
Australia  Cash rate  2/1998–
6/2010
 
37 (137)  4 (5)  14 (27) 
New Zealand  Cash rate  3/1999–
5/2010
 
37 (90)  4 (4)  7 (19) 
Canada  Overnight target rate  12/2000–
6/2010
 
39 (77)  4 (4)  9 (20) 
United 
Kingdom 
Bank rate  7/1997–
5/2010 
44 (156)  6 (6)  8 (29) 
Korea,  
Republic of 
Bank of Korea base 
rate (overnight call 
rate prior to 3/2008) 
8/2004–
5/2010 
16 (71)  6 (7)  7 (30) 





29 (54)  5 (6)  15 (30) 




8 (42)  3 (4)  5 (19) 
Thailand  14-day repurchase 
(repo) rate, 1- day 






26 (68)  3 (4)  5 (20) 
 
Notes: 
For Australia, 1998 reflects the start of public announcements of changes by the Reserve Bank of Australia. For Canada, 
a fixed decision schedule started in 2000. Sample start dates for New Zealand and the United Kingdom are the same as 
Kearns and Manners (2005). For Thailand and the Republic of Korea, the start date reflects the availability of interbank 
rate data from Bloomberg and Datastream, respectively. For Malaysia, all publicly available decisions are used. Decisions 
for  Indonesia  are  available since  July  2005,  but  observations  2005  are  excluded  due  to  extreme  volatility  in market 
interest rates during that period associated with a change in the monetary policy framework. 
* The BI rate is available since July 2005, before the start of our sample. Previously, the policy rate was 30-day BI 
certificate (SBI) rate.  
** Refer to June 2002–16 January 2007, 16 January 2007–11 February 2008 and 12 February 2008–present, respectively. 
Since 12 February 2008, with the closure of the Bank of Thailand operated repo market, the policy rate was switched to 
the 1-day bilateral repo rate. 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics: Average Absolute Value 
 
  Full sample    Standard Crisis Period 
  Δe  Δs  un
t i    P
t i    ,
un
Ft i      un
t i    ,
un
Ft i    P
t i   
Australia  0.658  0.648  0.040  0.091  0.045    0.263  0.295  0.750 
Canada  0.454  0.853  0.046  0.159  0.050    0.128  0.105  0.500 
Korea, Republic of  0.498  1.015  0.049  0.081  0.031    0.357  0.239  0.464 
New Zealand  0.705  0.526  0.048  0.161  0.068    0.093  0.224  1.125 
United Kingdom  0.439  0.907  0.052  0.096  0.036    0.323  0.239  0.750 
Indonesia  0.411  1.242  0.122  0.171  0.123    0.286  0.363  0.333 
Malaysia  0.199  0.650  0.055  0.065  0.049    0.355  0.325  0.375 
Thailand  0.236  1.036  0.051  0.138  0.044    0.369  0.333  0.563 
                   
OECD  0.551  0.782  0.047  0.113  0.045    0.255  0.227  0.692 
Non-OECD  0.284  1.003  0.075  0.130  0.071    0.329  0.343  0.411 
All  0.488  0.834  0.054  0.117  0.051    0.281  0.268  0.594 
                   
 
Note: 
Δe and  Δs are percentage changes in exchange rate and stock price index respectively.  un
t i  is the percentage point 
change in 1-month market interest rate.  P
t i  is the percentage point change in policy rate.  ,
un
Ft i    is the change in the 
expected future 2-month policy rate (1-month in the future) as measured by the weighted difference between the change 
in the 3-month and 1-month market interest rates (Equation 6). 
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  Standard Crisis Period  Broad Crisis Period 
  β 
R
2 
/ n  β  γ 
R
2 




Panel A: Exchange Rates 
Australia  5.42***  11.9  5.66***  –3.92  12.2  5.04***  1.36  12.0 
  [4.86]  135  [5.24]  [–0.44]  135  [4.02]  [0.51]  135 
Canada  1.86*  6.3  1.73*  0.80  6.5  2.32*  –1.10  6.9 
   [1.88]  77  [1.77]  [0.22]  77  [1.77]  [–0.55]  77 
Korea, Republic of  –0.18  0.1  –0.60  0.58  0.2  –0.41  0.30  0.1 
   [–0.12]  68  [–0.67]  [0.28]  68  [–0.42]  [0.15]  68 
New Zealand  2.62***  5.1  2.37*  2.62  5.6  1.61  3.30  6.9 
   [2.04]  90  [1.73]  [0.76]  90  [1.26]  [1.15]  90 
United Kingdom  1.00***  1.8  1.34**  –1.57**  2.6  1.36**  –1.48**  2.6 
  [2.23]  155  [2.60]  [–2.64]  155  [2.55]  [–2.55]  155 
Indonesia  0.54  2.7  0.92*  –1.32*  6.4  0.07  0.63  3.6 
  [1.20]  53  [1.85]  [–1.80]  53  [0.10]  [0.76]  53 
Malaysia  0.02  0.0  0.40  –1.18  1.5  0.13  –0.25  0.1 
  [0.05]  41  [0.65]  [–1.54]  41  [0.20]  [–0.28]  41 
Thailand  0.47  1.5  0.33  0.24  1.6  0.28  0.32  1.6 
   [1.04]  65  [0.33]  [0.23]  65  [0.27]  [0.29]  65 
                 
OECD  1.43***  3.3  2.33***  –1.58*  4.3  2.06***  –0.98  3.6 
  [2.84]  530  [4.79]  [–1.67]  530  [4.25]  [–1.13]  530 
Non-OECD  0.39*  2.1  0.84**  –0.78**  4.2  0.39  0.00  2.1 
  [1.94]  163  [2.48]  [–2.09]  163  [0.97]  [–0.01]  163 
All   1.11***  3.0  1.74***  –1.07*  3.7  1.54***  –0.60  3.2 
   [3.34]  694  [5.19]  [–1.71]  694  [4.33]  [–1.05]  694 
Panel B: Stock Markets 
Australia  0.28  0  0.53  –0.74  0  0.37  –0.18  0 
  [0.30]  136  [0.38]  –[0.46]  136  [0.26]  [–0.09]  136 
Canada  –1.80  2  –2.52**  5.72  3  –1.75  –0.13  2 
   [–1.11]  76  [–2.02]  [0.97]  76  [–1.36]  [–0.03]  76 
Korea, Republic of  –0.94  1  –2.36  1.56  1  –1.46  0.56  1 
   [–1.45]  69  [–1.06]  [0.66]  69  [–0.62]  [0.22]  69 
New Zealand  –3.03***  10  –2.91***  –1.25  10  –2.29**  –2.42  11 
   [–2.97]  90  [–2.62]  [–0.70]  90  [–2.36]  [–0.82]  90 
United Kingdom  –0.69  0  –1.09  1.82  0  –1.00  1.24  0 






  Standard Crisis Period  Broad Crisis Period 
  β  R
2 
/ n  β  γ  R
2 
/ n  β  γ  R
2 
/ n 
Indonesia  –1.90*  4  –0.99  –2.43  5  –1.25  –0.83  4 
  [–1.67]  54  [–0.86]  [–1.13]  54  [–0.59]  [–0.39]  54 
Malaysia  –1.17**  2  –0.93  –0.35  2  –0.66  –0.72  2 
  [–2.16]  41  [–0.56]  [–0.18]  41  [–0.39]  [–0.38]  41 
Thailand  0.49  0  1.22  –4.96***  1  1.41  –5.15***  2 
   0.36  64  [0.98]  [–4.70]  64  [1.16]  [–3.16]  64 
                 
OECD  –0.97**  1  –1.66**  1.34  1  –1.29  0.54  1 
  [–2.03]  530  [–2.51]  [1.37]  530  [–1.81]  [0.57]  530 
Non-OECD  –1.53***  3  –0.32  –2.02**  4  –0.15  –1.78*  3 
  [–3.02]  164  [–0.45]  [–2.34]  164  [–0.15]  [–1.73]  164 
All  –1.16***  1  –1.09**  –0.13  1  –0.88  –0.41  1 
  [–3.41]  694  [–2.18]  [–0.20]  694  [–1.52]  [–0.59]  694 
                 
 
Note:  
Dependent variable is the percentage change in the USD/local currency exchange rate or the percentage change in the 
stock market index. β is the estimated coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate ( un
t i  ). γ is the estimated 
coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate interacted with the crisis dummy ( , . un
t C t id  ).Robust T-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, ** and * reflect significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. Influential observations 
are excluded. All units are in percentage point, except R
2 in percent and ―n‖ is the number of observations. 
 
 
Table 3: Continued  
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Table 4: Include Crisis Dummy and All Observations 
 
  Equation 5: Standard Crisis Period  Equation 5: Broad Crisis Period 
  β  γ  δ  R
2 / n  β  γ  δ  R
2/ n 
Panel A: Exchange Rates 
OECD  2.32***  -1.99  0.21  3.89  2.08***  -1.81*  -0.07  2.66 
  [4.77]  [-1.60]  [0.51]  531  [4.28]  [-1.78]  [-0.69]  531 
Non-OECD  0.81**  0.10  0.21  6.27  0.35  0.43  0.03  5.41 
  [2.39]  [0.14]  [0.92]  164  [0.84]  [0.72]  [0.37]  164 
All   1.72***  -1.20  0.21  3.38  1.55***  -1.08  -0.04  2.26 
  [5.15]  [-1.40]  [0.71]  695  [4.37]  [-1.62]  [-0.56]  695 
Panel B: Stock Markets 
OECD  -1.60***  1.56  -1.06*  4.87  -1.24*  2.15  -0.12  1.33 
  [-2.41]  [0.75]  [-1.91]  531  [-1.73]  [1.35]  [-0.75]  531 
Non-OECD  -0.15  -5.30***  -1.91**  11.85  0.31  -2.56**  -0.38  4.89 
  [-0.21]  [-2.93]  [-2.16]  164  [0.32]  [-2.24]  [-1.50]  164 
All  -1.00  -0.79  -1.28**  4.28  -0.76  0.43  -0.21  0.79 
  [-1.99]  [-0.43]  [-2.52]  695  [-1.31]  [0.35]  [-1.59]  695 
   
Note:  
Dependent variable is the percentage change in the bilateral US/local currency exchange rate or the percentage in the 
stock market index. β is the estimated coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate ( un
t i  ). γ is the estimated 
coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate interacted with the crisis dummy ( , . un
t C t id  ). δ is the estimated 
coefficient of the crisis dummy variable ( , Ct d ). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * reflect significance at 
the 1%, 5% and 10% levels. All units are in percentage point, except R
2 in percent and ―n‖ is the number of observations. 
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Table 5: Timing  and Levels Surprises 
 
  Panel A: Exchange Rates   Panel B: Stock Markets 
  Equation 3  Equation 7  Equation 3  Equation 7 
  β  R
2/n  Timing 
β  λ 
Levels 
β+λ  β  R
2/n  Timing 
β  λ 
Levels 
β+λ 
                     
Australia  5.42***  11.9  2.50  4.09**  6.59**  0.28  0.04  -2.22  2.98*  0.77 
  [4.86]  135  [1.38]  [2.00]  [5.26]  [0.30]  136  [-1.42]  [1.85]  [0.74] 
Canada  1.86*  6.3  -0.08  2.37  2.29**  -1.80  1.61  3.64  -6.70**  -3.07** 
   [1.88]  77  [-0.04]  [1.04]  [1.97]  [-1.11]  76  [1.27]  [-2.08]  [2.09] 
Korea,  
 Republic of 
-0.18  0.1  1.61  -3.39  -1.78  -0.94  1.17  -1.54  0.97  -0.57 
[-0.12]  68  [1.00]  [-0.72]  [0.49]  [-1.45]  69  [-0.64]  [0.26]  [0.36] 
New Zealand  2.62**  5.1  -2.27  4.95***  2.67**  -3.03***  9.92  1.50  -4.58**  -3.08*** 
   [2.04]  90  [-1.35]  [3.30]  [2.33]  [-2.97]  90  [0.85]  [-2.53]  [3.28] 
United  
 Kingdom 
1.00**  1.8  0.15  1.37  1.52**  -0.69  0.19  -3.55*  4.62  1.07 
[2.23]  155  [0.21]  [1.18]  [2.17]  [-0.65]  155  [-1.71]  [1.60]  [0.69] 
Indonesia  0.54  2.7  0.60  -0.11  0.49  -1.90*  3.56  -1.27  -0.90  -2.17 
  [1.20]  53  [1.48]  [-0.23]  [0.86]  [-1.67]  54  [-1.04]  [-0.69]  [1.63] 
Thailand  0.47  1.5  1.69  -1.46  0.23  0.49  0.09  4.90  -5.92  -1.02 
   [1.04]  65  [0.70]  [-0.55]  [0.47]  [0.36]  64  [0.83]  [-0.78]  [0.45] 
Malaysia  0.02  0.0  0.33  -0.33  0.00  -1.17**  1.57  2.45  -3.91  -1.45*** 
  [0.05]  41  [0.27]  [-0.33]  [0.01]  [-2.16]  41  [0.59]  [-0.93]  [3.25] 
                     
OECD  1.43***  3.3  -0.33  2.27**  1.94**  -0.97**  0.67  -0.49  -0.64  -1.13** 
  [2.84]  530  [-0.38]  [2.17]  [2.98]  [-2.03]  530  [-0.53]  [-0.60]  [2.07] 
Non-OECD  0.39*  2.1  0.59*  -0.25  0.33  -1.53***  2.55  -0.77  -0.94  -1.71*** 
  [1.94]  163  [1.92]  [-0.72]  [1.48]  [-3.02]  164  [-0.82]  [-0.85]  [2.91] 
All  1.11***  3.0  -0.05  1.47**  1.42**  -1.16***  1.14  -0.59  -0.74  -1.32*** 
   [3.34]  694  [-0.09]  [2.14]  [3.52]  [-3.41]  694  [-0.89]  [-0.98]  [3.43] 
 
Note:  
Dependent variable is the percentage change in the USD/local currency exchange rate or the percentage change in the stock market index. β 
is the estimated coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate ( un
t i  ). λ is the estimated coefficient of the change in the expected 
future  2-month  market  interest  rate  one  month  from  now  ( ,
un
Ft i  ).  Influential  observations  are  excluded.  Robust  T-statistics  are  in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * reflect significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. The t-statistic on β+λ is a Wald test. All units are in 
percentage point, except R
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Table 6: Unanticipated and Anticipated Policy Changes 
 
  Equation 8: Exchange rate  Equation 8: Stock Market 
  θ  β  R
2 (%) / n  θ  β  R
2 (%) / n 
             
Australia  -0.53  5.54***  12.9  1.12  -0.17  4.83 
  [-1.02]  [5.22]  135  [1.37]  [-0.18]  136 
Canada  -0.33  2.01**  7.5  0.60  -2.07  2.73 
   [-0.99]  [2.05]  77  [0.76]  [-1.27]  76 
Korea, Republic of  -0.59**  0.02  0.4  -0.37  -0.87  1.21 
   [-2.09]  [0.01]  68  [-0.23]  [-1.26]  69 
New Zealand  -0.29  2.85**  5.9  0.19  -3.18***  10.41 
   [-0.60]  [2.02]  90  [0.41]  [-2.76]  90 
United Kingdom  -0.52  1.22**  3.3  2.00**  -1.54  5.11 
  [-1.23]  [2.56]  155  [2.13]  [-1.35]  155 
Indonesia  -0.20  0.54  3.1  -2.37**  1.85*  8.02 
  [-0.65]  [1.21]  53  [-2.05]  [-1.79]  54 
Malaysia  2.59***  -0.71**  8.2  -1.34  -0.98  1.77 
  [3.74]  [-2.52]  41  [-0.63]  [-1.66]  41 
Thailand  0.00  0.47  1.5  -3.12***  4.29***  11.23 
   [0.02]  [0.84]  65  [-2.82]  [3.01]  64 
             
OECD  -0.46  1.62***  4.4  0.73**  -1.27**  2.13 
  [-1.77]  [3.19]  530  [2.01]  [-2.53]  530 
Non-OECD  0.01  0.39*  2.1  -1.82***  -1.03**  5.36 
  [0.04]  [1.92]  163  [-2.78]  [-2.09]  164 
All  -0.39*  1.25***  3.9  0.39  -1.30***  1.47 
   [-1.74]  [3.67]  694  [1.18]  [-3.56]  694 
Note:  
Dependent variable is the percentage change in the bilateral USD exchange rate or the percentage change in the stock market 
index.  β is the estimated coefficient of the change in the 1-month market interest rate bill ( un
t i  ). θ is the coefficient of the 
anticipated change in the policy rate ( a
t i  ). Robust t-statistics are in parentheses. ***, ** and * reflect significance at the 1%, 5% 
and 10% levels respectively. Influential observations are excluded. All units are in percentage point, except R
2 in percent and 
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Figure 1. Australia, Changes in Policy      Figure 2. United Kingdom, Changes in  
Rate and Market Interest Rate        Policy Rate and Market Interest Rate 
(percentage point)            (percentage point) 
 











Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day.      Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day. 
Source: Reserve Bank of Australia.        Source: Bank of Canada. 
 
Figure 3: New Zealand, Changes in              Figure 4: Canada, Changes in  
Policy Rate and Market Interest Rate             Policy  Rate  and  Market  Interest 
(percentage point)                             Rate (percentage point) 
 











Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day.      Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day. 
Source: Reserve Bank of New Zealand.        Sources: Bank of England and Datastream. 
 
Figure 5: Indonesia, Changes in       Figure 6: Republic of Korea,  
Policy Rate and Market Interest Rate    Changes in Policy Rate and  
(percentage point)          Market Interest Rate  
(percentage point) 
      









Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day.      Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day. 
Sources: Bank Indonesia and Bloomberg        Sources: Bank of Korea and Datastream.  
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Change in 1-month rate
Figure 7: Malaysia, Changes in              Figure 8: Thailand, Changes in 
Policy Rate and Market Interest Rate            Policy Rate and Market Interest  
(percentage point)                  Rate (percentage point) 












Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day.      Note: Rate changes based on policy decision day. 
Source: Bank Negara Malaysia and Bloomberg.      Sources: Bank of Thailand and Bloomberg. 
 
 
                     Figure 9: All Countries, Changes in 1-Month and Expected  
























Note: Observations during the financial crisis (9/2008-3/2009) are in darker shade. Rate 
changes are based on policy decision day. 












































































































































































































































Figure 10: Australia, Daily 1-Month Bank           Figure 11: Australia, Changes in  
Bill Minus 1-Month OIS Spread                            1- Month Bank Bill and 1-Month 
(percentage point)                                                    OIS Spread 
                                                                                 (percentage point) 
 
   











Source: Reserve Bank of Australia.        Source: Reserve Bank of Australia. 
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Table A1: Details on Excluded Observations 
 
Regression  Country  Date  Influence Statistics  ∆f  IB
t i   
             
Country  Exchange rate  United Kingdom  06-Nov-2008  0.38  -1.44  -1.20 
Country  Exchange rate  Australia  07-Oct-2008  0.78  1.00  -0.65 
Country  Exchange rate  Australia  04-Nov-2008  0.88  2.78  -0.42 
Country  Exchange rate  Korea, Republic of  09-Oct-2008  0.35  3.70  0.00 
Country  Exchange rate  Korea, Republic of  27-Oct-2008  0.73  -3.23  -0.60 
Country  Exchange rate  Korea, Republic of  11-Dec-2008  1.76  2.58  -0.89 
Country  Exchange rate  Indonesia  07-Jan-2009  0.85  -2.57  -0.44 
Country  Exchange rate  Thailand  27-Jun-2003  0.39  -0.69  -0.30 
Country  Exchange rate  Thailand  03-Dec-2008  0.84  -0.22  -0.78 
Country  Exchange rate  Malaysia  21-Jan-2009  1.27  0.12  -0.69 
Country  Exchange rate  Malaysia  24-Feb-2009  0.42  -0.11  -0.48 
OECD  Exchange rate  Korea, Republic of  11-Dec-2008  0.71  2.58  -0.89 
Non-OECD  Exchange rate  Indonesia  07-Jan-2009  0.70  -2.57  -0.44 
All  Exchange rate  Korea, Republic of  11-Dec-2008  0.56  2.58  -0.89 
Country  Stock market  United Kingdom  06-Nov-2008  5.01  -5.70  -1.20 
Country  Stock market  Canada  21-Oct-2008  0.52  -4.44  -0.17 
Country  Stock market  Australia  07-Oct-2008  1.39  1.17  -0.65 
Country  Stock market  Korea, Republic of  08-Jun-2006  0.31  -3.45  0.16 
Country  Stock market  Korea, Republic of  09-Jan-2009  0.58  -2.05  -0.41 
Country  Stock market  Thailand  08-Oct-2008  0.32  -6.88  0.00 
Country  Stock market  Thailand  03-Dec-2008  0.72  1.45  -0.78 
Country  Stock market  Thailand  14-Jan-2009  0.42  1.31  -0.47 
Country  Stock market  Malaysia  21-Jan-2009  0.30  0.64  -0.69 
Country  Stock market  Malaysia  04-Mar-2010  0.40  1.22  0.12 
OECD  Stock market  United Kingdom  06-Nov-2008  1.42  -5.70  -1.20 
Non-OECD  Stock market  None excluded 




∆f refers to either the percentage change in the USD/local currency exchange rate or the percentage change in stock 
price index. ∆i
IB is the change in the 1-month interest rates on the day of announcement. The excluded outliers are 
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Table A2: Data Description, Sources and Timing 
 
Country  Policy Rate and 
Policy Release  Bank Bill Rate  Exchange Rate  Stock Market Index 




Period: Feb.-’98 to 
Jun.-’10. 
Release: 2.30 pm on 
meeting day (Feb. 
2008–present). 9.30 
am on day after 
meeting (before Feb. 
2008). 
Source: Reserve 




30-day and 90-day 
bank accepted bills. 
Source: RBA Bulletin, 
Table F01dHist. 
Timing: End of Day 
Rates (from 1995). 1 
Day Lag (before Feb 
2008 ). No Lag (Feb 
2008 onwards). 
USD per AUD. 
Source: Bloomberg 
AUD Curncy ―Last 
Price‖. 
Timing: No lag 
(relative to 
announcement). The 
exchange rate is 
quoted at 5 pm New 
York time which is 






AS30 Index ―Last 
Price‖.   
Timing: Market 
closes at around 4 
pm, which is after 
announcement (no 





Overnight target rate. 
Period: Dec.-’00 to 
Jun.-’00. 
Release: 9 am on 
fixed announcement 
days. Source: Bank 




Source: Bank of 
Canada’s website.  
Timing: Calculated 
around midday 
according to Bank of 
Canada—no lag. 
 
USD per CAD 
Source: Bloomberg 
CAD Curncy ―Last 
Price‖.  Timing: 
Quoted about 5 pm, 
which is after 
announcement so 
use change on day—
no lag. 
S&P/TSX Composite.  
Source: Bloomberg 
SPTSX Index ―Last 
Price‖.   
Timing: Market 








Bank of Korea base 
rate and overnight 
cash rate (prior to 
Mar. 2008). 
Period: Aug.-’04 to 
May-’10. 
About 10.30-11.00 
am. Source: Bank of 
Korea’s website, 
contacts and CEIC. 
 







10.40–10.55 am local 
time.* No lag 
(identified from 
graph). 
USD per Won  
Source: Bloomberg 
KRW Curncy ―Last 
Price‖.  
Timing: Market 
closes 3 pm local 
time (2 am New 
York), after the rate 
decision—no lag. 
[Republic of] Korea 
Composite Stock 
Price Index (KOSPI).  
Source: Bloomberg 
KOSPI ―Last Price‖, 
Timing: Market 
closes at 3 pm (2 am 








Period: Mar.-’99 to 
May-’10. 
Release: 9 am on 
scheduled days 
(meeting the day 
before). 
Source: Reserve 






Source: RBNZ Table 
hb2. 
Timing: 11.10 am . 
After announcement 
so use change on 
day—no lag. 
 
USD per NZD  
Source: RBNZ Table 
hb1. 
Timing: 11.10 am 
release according to 
RBNZ. After 
announcement so 
use change on day—
no lag. 
NZSE All Index. 
Source: Bloomberg 
NZSE Index ―Last 
Price‖.  Timing: 
Market closes at 4-5 








Period: Jul.-’97 to 
May-’10. 
Release: Announced 
at 12 pm (noon) on 




Source:  Datastream 
USD per GBP  
Source: Bloomberg 
GBP Curncy ―Last 
Price‖. 
Timing: 5 pm New 
FTSE100 Index. 
Source: Bloomberg: 
UKX Index ―Last 
Price‖. Timing: 
Market closes about  
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Country  Policy Rate and 
Policy Release  Bank Bill Rate  Exchange Rate  Stock Market Index 
the 2
nd day of 
committee meeting 
(fixed date). 




Timing: LIBOR are 
quoted at 11 am 
London time (source: 
bbalibor.com). Before 
announcement—1 
day lag.  
 
York time which is 
10pm London time.  
After announcement 
on the day—no lag. 
4.30pm which is after 
announcement—no 
lag. 
Indonesia  Bank Indonesia rate. 
Period: Jan.-’06 to 
Jun.-’10. 
Release: Meeting 
ends at 12. Results 
released at 1 pm on 
day of meeting. 
Source: Bank 
Indonesia’s website,  
contacts, and 
Datastream. 





JIIN1M Index & 
JIIN3M Index. 
Timing: Rates 
submitted by banks 
between 7 am to 
11.30 am.  Before 
rate decision—1 day 
lag (identified from 
graph). 
 
USD per IDR 
Source:  Bloomberg 
IDR Curncy ―Last 
Price‖.  
Timing: 4 pm local 
time (5 am New York) 





JCI Index ―Last 
Price‖.  
Timing: Market 
closes at 4.15 pm 
local (5.15 am NYC), 
which is after 
announcement—no 
lag. 
Malaysia  Overnight policy rate. 
Period: Aug.-’04 to 
May-’10. 
Release: 6 pm of the 
fixed announcement 
day. 
Source: Bank Negara 
Malaysia’s website 
and Datastream. 
1-month and 3-month 
fixing Kuala Lumpur 
Interbank Offered 
Rates (KLIBOR).  
Source: Bloomberg 
KLIB1M and KLIB3M 
Index.  
Timing: 11 am on the 
day. Before the rate 
change hence need 1 




USD per MYR  
Source: Bloomberg 
MYR Curncy ―Last 
Price‖.  
Timing: Not a 24 hour 
market. Open 8 am-5 
pm local time. Close 
is before 6pm 
announcement—1 
day lag. 







closes at 5 pm—
before 
announcement—
need 1 day lag. 
Thailand 
 
14-day repo rate, 1-
day repo rate and 1-
day bilateral repo 
rate. 
Period: Jun.-’02 to 
Jun.-’10. 
Release: 2.30 pm on 
the Meeting day 
Source: Bank of 
Thailand’s website. 
1-month and 3-month 
fixing Bangkok 
Interbank Offered 
Rates BIBOR).   
Source: Bloomberg 
BOFX1M and 
BOFX3M Index ―Last 
Price‖. 
Timing: 11.15 am 
each day, (quoted as 
00.15 in New York). 
Before policy 
announcements—1 
day lag.  
 
USD per Baht 
Source: Bloomberg 
THB Curncy ―Last 
Price‖.  
Timing: 5 pm in New 
York is early the 
following morning in 
Thailand, which is 
after the decision—
no lag.  




SET Index ―Last 
Price‖. Timing: 
Market closes at 4.45 




Table A2: Continued 
Note: 
All dates are daily. Exchange rates are quoted as USD/local currency. 
* See http://www.kfb.or.kr/kfb_eng/koribor/koribor01.htm  
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Table A3: Effect of Policy Surprises on Financial Variables 





  Standard Crisis Period  Broad Crisis Period 
  β  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2/ n 
  Panel A: Exchange Rates 
Australia  0.56  0.3  5.67***  -8.32***  15.3  5.06***  -6.41***  8.2 
  [0.36]  137  [5.26]  [-4.64]  137  [4.05]    [-3.46]  137 
Canada  1.86*  6.3  1.73*  0.80  6.5  2.32*  -1.10  6.9 
   [1.88]  77  [1.77]  [0.22]  77  [1.77]  [-0.55]  77 
Korea,    
Republic of 
-0.24  0.2  -0.87  0.69  0.2  -0.68  0.47  0.2 
   [-0.13]  71  [-0.86]  [0.29]  71  [-0.64]  [0.21]  71 
New Zealand  2.62**  5.1  2.37*  2.62  5.6  1.61  3.30  6.9 
   [2.04]  90  [1.73]  [0.76]  90  [1.26]  [1.15]  90 
United 
Kingdom 
   1.12***  5.3  1.35***  -0.34  5.4  1.37**    -0.36  5.4 
  [5.57]  156  [2.63]  [-0.63]  156  [2.57]  [-0.64]  156 
Indonesia  1.17  9.6  0.87*  0.80  10.8  -0.07  1.58  13.4 
  [1.61]  54  [1.73]  [0.45]  54  [-0.10]  [1.33]  54 
Malaysia  -0.01  0.0  0.40  -0.50  0.7  0.13  -0.17  0.1 
  [-0.10]  43  [0.65]  [-0.72]  43  [0.21]  [-0.25]  43 
Thailand  0.55**  4.4  1.00  -0.60  5.4  0.99  -0.58  5.4 
   [2.03]  67  [1.21]  [-0.73]  67  [1.16]  [-0.68]  67 
                 
OECD  0.88  1.4  2.33***  -2.31**  3.7  2.06***  -1.71*  2.5 
  [1.36]  531  [4.79]  [-2.14]  531  [4.24]  [-1.69]  531 
Non-OECD  0.67*  5.0  0.83**  -0.27  5.2  0.38  0.38  5.3 
  [1.94]  164  [2.45]  [-0.43]  164  [0.93]  [0.64]  164 
All   0.80*  1.6  1.74***  -1.52**  3.1  1.53***  -1.02  2.2 
   [1.87]  695  [5.18]  [-2.11]  695  [4.32]  [-1.54]  695 
  Panel B: Stock Markets 
Australia  -0.63  0  0.53  -1.90  1  0.37      -1.42  1 
  [-0.81]  137  [0.38]  [-1.25]  137  [0.26]     [-0.90]  137 
Canada  -0.48  0  -2.56**  12.31**  10  -1.81       3.19  1 
   [-0.25]  77  [-2.04]  [2.01]  77  [-1.39]     [0.72]  77 
New Zealand  -3.03***  10  -2.91**  -1.25  10  -2.29**     -2.42  11 
   [-2.97]  90  [-2.62]  [-0.70]  90  [-2.36]    [-0.82]  90 
Korea,    
Republic of 
-0.71  1  -6.12  6.00  4  -5.96      5.74  3  
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  Standard Crisis Period  Broad Crisis Period 
  β  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2/ n 
   [-0.79]  71  [-1.57]  [1.49]  71  [-1.34]     [1.26]  71 
United 
Kingdom 
2.45*  5  -1.07  5.16***  10  -0.98      4.95***  10 
  [1.74]  156  [-0.81]  [3.50]  156  [-0.72]     [3.21]  156 
Indonesia  -1.90*  4  -0.99  -2.43  5  -1.25     -0.83  4 
  [-1.67]  54  [-0.86]  [-1.13]  54  [-0.59]    [-0.39]  54 
Malaysia  -0.92**  2  0.23  -1.39  2  -0.82     -0.12  2 
  [-2.52]  43  [0.12]  [-0.66]  43  [-0.49]    [-0.06]  43 
Thailand  -1.73**  2  1.06  -3.69***  4  1.26     -3.91***  5 
   [-2.41]  67  [0.82]  [-3.02]  67  [1.00]    [-3.22]  67 
                 
OECD  0.33  0  -1.65**  3.15**  2  -1.28*      2.33  1 
  [0.31]  531  [-2.49]  [2.06]  531  [-1.79]     [1.52]  531 
Non-OECD  -1.53***  3  -0.32  -2.02**  4  -0.15     -1.78*  3 
  [-3.02]  164  [-0.45]  [-2.34]  164  [-0.15]    [-1.73]  164 
All  -0.32  0  -1.07**  1.23  0  -0.87      0.76  0 
   [-0.40]  695  [-2.15]  [0.99]  695  [-1.49]     [0.65]  695 
                 
 
Notes:  
Dependent variable is the percentage change in the USD/local currency exchange rate or the percentage change in the 
stock market index. β is the estimated coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate ( un
t i  ). γ is the estimated 
coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate interacted with the crisis dummy ( , . un
t C t id  ). Robust T-statistics 
are in parentheses. ***, ** and * reflect significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All units are in percentage 
point, except R
2 in percent and ―n‖ is the number of observations. 
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Table A4: Effect of Policy Surprises on Financial Variables (Robust Regression) 
 
  Equation 3 
Equation 4 
  Standard Crisis Period  Broad Crisis Period 
  β  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2 / n 
Panel A. Exchange Rates 
Australia      4.96***  14.5%      4.76***    -11.31***   22.2%   4.09***    -3.99**   6.6% 
  [4.75]  135  [4.37]  [-6.06]  136     [3.08]  [-2.53]  137 
Canada   1.49*   4.7%       1.82***  -13.30*     9.2%    3.28***     -3.44**  14.4% 
   [1.92]  77  [2.24]  [-1.76]  75     [3.52]   [-2.41]  77 
Korea, Republic of     1.20**   8.2%      -0.65      2.49**   14.6%     -0.35     2.02*  12.0% 
   [2.45]  69     [-0.70]   [2.23]  69    [-0.34]    [1.69]  69 
New Zealand   2.16*   3.8%       1.80   14.52*     6.7%      0.88       5.38**  10.6% 
       [1.87]  90      [1.50]   [1.71]  89     [0.66]    [2.26]  90 
United Kingdom      1.04***   5.5%   1.12*  -1.31    2.2%      1.12*   -1.16    2.1% 
  [2.99]  156  [1.85]  [-1.02]  155     [1.81]   [-0.94]  155 
Indonesia       0.26   0.8%  0.55  -1.08   3.3%     -0.05    0.41   1.2% 
  [0.64]  54  [1.09]  [-1.19]  53    [-0.06]    [0.46]  54 
Malaysia       0.00   0.0%  0.66  -0.77   2.8%      0.25   -0.29    0.3% 
     [-0.01]  43  [1.01]  [-1.06]  43     [0.34]   [-0.36]  43 
Thailand  0.44   3.7%    1.26**  -0.86   9.0%  1.27**   -0.87    9.1% 
   [1.58]  67  [2.23]  [-1.34]  67     [2.22]   [-1.34]  67 
                 
OECD     1.41***   5.0%     1.77***      -0.69   5.1%   1.66***  -0.44   4.9% 
      [5.28]  530      [4.35]  [-1.29]  530     [3.72]  [-0.80]  530 
Non-OECD       0.20   0.8%       0.49  -0.43   2.0%      0.35  -0.19   1.0% 
  [1.14]  164  [1.79]  [-1.23]  163     [0.97]  [-0.45]  164 
All       0.82***   3.1%      1.19***     -0.74**   3.0%    1.15***  -0.53   3.0% 
   [4.70]  695  [4.23]  [-2.08]  695     [3.52]  [-1.39]  695 
Panel B. Stock Markets 
Australia      -0.72  1%       0.99  -3.28  3%      0.26      -1.38  1% 
     [-0.88]  137  [0.76]  [-1.73]  136     [0.18]     [-0.77]  137 
Canada      -1.49  2%      -2.19  9.37  19%     -1.64       0.75  2%  
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  Standard Crisis Period  Broad Crisis Period 
  β  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2 / n  β  γ  R
2 / n 
      [-1.20]  77     [-1.62]  [1.65]  76    [-1.00]  [0.30]  77 
Korea, Republic of  -0.29  0%  -3.54  3.17  2%      -2.61  2.48  1% 
   [-0.30]  71  [-1.01]  [0.83]  71     [-0.70]  [0.63]  71 
New Zealand      -
2.00***  8%     -1.77**  No obs  6%   -1.83**     -4.83***  18% 
   [-2.70]  90  [-2.23]  No obs  87     [-2.05]     [-2.50]  89 
United Kingdom  -0.99  1%  -1.55  0.33  2%      -1.39  1.27  1% 
  [-0.98]  155  [-1.35]  [0.09]  154     [-1.20]  [0.55]  155 
Indonesia  -1.35  2%  -0.02  -4.48  7%      -0.26      -1.42  2% 
  [-0.99]  54  [-0.01]  [-1.51]  54     [-0.10]     [-0.48]  54 
Malaysia  -1.14*  7%  -0.88  0.71  7%      -1.00      -0.15  7% 
     [-1.79]  43  [-0.50]  [0.27]  42     [-0.54]     [-0.07]  43 
Thailand      -1.46  2%  1.60       -4.17  3%       1.66      -3.97  5% 
      [-1.23]  67  [0.68]  [-0.56]  65  [0.70]     [-1.48]  67 
                 
OECD  -1.00**  1%   -1.48**  0.34  2%   -1.27**       0.43  1% 
    [-2.48]  530     [-2.54]  [0.37]  530     [-2.00]  [0.53]  530 
Non-OECD     -1.07  2%       0.32    -3.72**  6%       0.57      -2.06  3% 
    [-1.64]  164  [0.32]      [-2.48]  164  [0.43]     [-1.39]  164 
All   -0.99***  1%      -0.70   -1.25*  2%      -0.64      -0.51  1% 




Dependent variable is the percentage change in the USD/local currency exchange rate or the percentage change in the 
stock market index. β is the estimated coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate ( un
t i  ). γ is the estimated 
coefficient of the change in 1-month market interest rate interacted with the crisis dummy ( , . un
t C t id  ). T-statistics are in 
parentheses. ***, ** and * reflect significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% levels respectively. All units are in percentage point, 
except R
2 in percent and ―n‖ is the number of observations. Stata’s robust regression (rreg) is used with default settings. 
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  The Impact of Monetary Policy on Financial Markets in Small Open Economies:            
More or Less Effective During the Global Financial Crisis?
This paper estimates the impact of monetary policy on exchange rates and stock markets 
for eight small open economies: Australia, Canada, the Republic of Korea, New Zealand, 
the United Kingdom, Indonesia, Malaysia and Thailand. On average, across these countries 
covering crisis and non-crisis periods, a one percentage point surprise rise in official interest 
rates leads to a 1% appreciation of the exchange rate and a 1% fall in stock market indices. 
The effect on exchange rates is notably weaker in the non-Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries with a managed float. For the OECD 
countries, there is no robust evidence of a change in the effect of policy during the global 
financial crisis. For the non-OECD countries, there is some evidence of a stronger effect of 
policy on stock markets during the crisis.
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